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Robert Kent Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
Thanks very much to Joe Bacchi, Brad Baranowski, Chris Hamilton, and the editors of the
Boston University Law Review for providing this space for conversation about my book,
Who’s the Bigot? Thanks, of course, to Professors Sonu Bedi, John Corvino, James Fleming,
Imer Flores, Melissa Murray, and Douglas NeJaime for engaging with my book manuscript
and contributing to this symposium. Extra thanks to Imer Flores for hosting the live
conference at the Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México, where I was able to benefit from earlier versions of most of these commentaries.
Thanks also to Justin Dyer, Director of the Kinder Institute on Constitutional Democracy,
University of Missouri, for including a book symposium on my manuscript, in which
Professor Bedi was a commentator, as part of the fifth Annual Shawnee Trail Conference,
held on March 7-8, 2019.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the joys of writing a book is the chance to have its arguments and
observations evaluated by creative and engaged readers. I am very grateful that
the scholars included in this book symposium provided such constructive
commentary on the manuscript of my book, Who’s the Bigot? Learning from
Conflicts over Marriage and Civil Rights Law.1 One of those commentators,
Professor Imer Flores, also generously hosted a wonderful live conference at
which I had the chance to hear and engage with early versions of several of these
commentaries.2 The final book, I hope, reflects improvements that grew out of
those exchanges. For that reason, one simple format for this response would be
a series of statements saying “I agree!” or, to paraphrase the old Prego spaghetti
sauce advertisement, “It’s in there!”3 The commentaries, however, also offer
some valuable normative prescriptions4 and spark useful questions about
important future investigations, such as the contested boundaries of public and
private space (and morality) in controversies over civil rights laws and religious
liberty,5 the application of the rhetoric of bigotry to past and present gender
discrimination,6 and the ways a law-and-literature lens might inform and
complement my study of bigotry.7 This response acknowledges (briefly) my
basic agreement with these commentaries and then offers preliminary thoughts
about some areas of future investigation.

1
See generally LINDA C. MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT? LEARNING FROM CONFLICTS OVER
MARRIAGE AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (forthcoming 2020) (on file with the Boston University
Law Review). Page references to Who’s the Bigot? in this Essay refer to the penultimate
version of the book (indicated as “manuscript”).
2
The conference took place on October 4-5, 2018, at the Instituto de Investigaciones
Jurídicas at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Professors Corvino, Fleming,
Murray, and NeJaime participated in that conference.
3
See Michelle Peddycord-Iasta, Prego & Supplier: “It’s in There!”, ESOURCING F. (Oct.
28, 2013), http://www.esourcingforum.com/archives/2013/10/28/prego-supplier-data-its-inthere/ [https://perma.cc/AJH4-V3RS].
4
For example, Professor Corvino’s caution about the risks of the rhetoric of bigotry and
reasons to use it sparingly is valuable. See generally John Corvino, Puzzles About Bigotry: A
Reply to McClain, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2587 (2019).
5
The commentaries by Professors Bedi, Fleming, and Murray sound these themes. See
generally Sonu Bedi, Moral Disapproval and the Meaning, Boundary, and Accommodation
of Bigotry, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2633 (2019); James E. Fleming, The Unnecessary and
Unfortunate Focus on “Animus,” “Bare Desire to Harm,” and “Bigotry” in Analyzing
Opposition to Gay and Lesbian Rights, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2671 (2019); Melissa Murray, The
Geography of Bigotry, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2611 (2019).
6
For this issue, see generally Douglas NeJaime, Bigotry in Time: Race, Sexual
Orientation, and Gender, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2651 (2019).
7
Imer Flores suggests this through a provocative pairing of my book with Harper Lee’s
novels in Imer B. Flores, The Rhetoric of Bigotry in Law, Life, and Literature: On Linda
McClain’s Who’s the Bigot?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2685 (2019).
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JOHN CORVINO

In Professor John Corvino’s lucid commentary, he views, “through a
philosophical lens,” the several puzzles about bigotry that I take up in Who’s the
Bigot?8 Corvino offers conceptual clarity about the messy language of bigotry
by proposing a working definition: “stubborn and unjustified contempt toward
groups of people, typically in the context of a larger system of subordination.”9
By contrast to some definitions, Corvino emphasizes “stubbornness” as a key
feature of bigotry.10 Corvino then sets out to show how the puzzles I raise
become “less puzzling” with this understanding in place.11 Reading his essay is
enough to give one philosophy envy: if only the discourse about bigotry and
everyday usages of the rhetoric of bigotry were equally clear. “Would that it
were so simple!”12
While my book’s project was not to offer a philosophical account of bigotry,
I find Corvino’s analysis and his emphasis on bigotry as “stubborn” illuminating.
Particularly interesting are his descriptions of bigotry as a “moral vice,” as well
as (in some cases) an “epistemic vice,” and “a matter of bad epistemic hygiene
regarding our fellow humans’ moral worth.” 13 With such terms, Corvino focuses
on the issue of how people arrive at their beliefs and whether they are willing,
with education and new information, to revise them. I also concur with
Corvino’s emphasis upon the importance of reasons and whether an underlying
belief is supported by reasons. Corvino argues that, because it is “generally
rational for young children to accept what their parents tell them,” a five-year
old who “accepts white supremacy but who with education will later abandon
that view is a racist but not a bigot.”14 Corvino adds that, “under normal
circumstances, any modern adult who accepts that view is bigoted.”15 In my
chapter on the scientific study of prejudice, I discuss a similar analysis by
pioneering prejudice scholar Gordon Allport, who explained that children are
not born bigots but become so through (mis)education by parents and other adult
figures; further education and social contact on terms of equality with minority
groups can lead to shame about those earlier beliefs and insight that those earlier

8

Corvino, supra note 4, at 2589.
Id. at 2590.
10
Id. (citing William M. Ramsey, Bigotry and Religious Belief, 94 PAC. PHIL. Q. 125, 128
(2013)).
11
Id. at 2594.
12
The allusion is to a ridiculous scene in the Coen brothers movie Hail Caesar!, in which
Ralph Fiennes, portraying a refined British actor, attempts to teach Alden Ehrenreich,
portraying a rodeo star in a musical-Western, how to utter the line quoted in text in a drawing
room drama. See HAIL CAESAR! (Universal Pictures 2016), https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=G629a_3MkkI.
13
Corvino, supra note 4, at 2593.
14
Id. at 2597.
15
Id.
9
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beliefs were wrong.16 Allport used the term bigot to refer to students who
showed inflexibility and a lack of insight about the origin of their beliefs. 17
To return to Corvino’s focus upon the importance of reasons, he argues that
“bigotry is a refusal to enter the realm of reasons.”18 He offers the “paradigmatic
case of racists who point to the Bible to justify their belief in segregation,”
observing that “on the surface . . . they are not bigoted,” because they offer
reasons for their belief.19 If, Corvino argues, this appeal to the Bible is “not a
genuine reason but merely a post hoc justification,” then their belief is, in reality,
“stubborn, unjustified contempt cloaked in a conscience costume.” 20 Corvino
suggests that I “lump[] sincerity and conscience together,” instead of treating
them as distinct.21 On his view, following one’s conscience concerns “acting
according to what one believes to be right,” while sincerity means an “absence
of deceit.”22
I think this criticism misses my point. In my book, I observe that, in some
recent controversies in which the rhetoric of bigotry features, such as religious
objections to same-sex marriage, people treat bigotry as the opposite of either
sincerity or conscience, so that neither a sincere, religious belief nor a belief
derived from conscience can be bigoted.23 Though Corvino offers interesting
hypotheticals about how a person acting on conscience may have a duty to be
insincere (e.g., misleading an axe-murderer at the door about the whereabouts
of your family members), my analysis focuses on real-world usage in recent,
high-profile constitutional litigation: before the U.S. Supreme Court, baker Jack
Phillips and his many amici described him as a “man of faith,” whose “sincere
religious belief” and “conscience” would be violated by having to create a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple.24 He was, they insisted, not a bigot by
contrast to racists of yesteryear.25 I pointed out that this contrast depends both
on arguing that racists who opposed desegregation and interracial marriage were
insincere and used their beliefs as a pretext and arguing that their beliefs were
clearly wrong and odious, by contrast to Phillips’s reasonable beliefs. 26
I will not repeat my entire analysis here; my point was to illustrate the
strategies used to distinguish present-day religious objections to civil marriage
equality from past objections to racial equality. As Corvino and I both agree, a
problem with the appeal to “reasonableness” in these kinds of arguments
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 25, 26, 31-32).
Id. (manuscript at 26).
Corvino, supra note 4, at 2595.
Id. at 2596.
Id. at 2596-97.
Id. at 2595.
Id.
MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6-7).
Id. (manuscript at 6-7, 195-96).
Id. (manuscript at 195-97).
Id. (manuscript at 129, 197).
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concerns the temporal dimension of bigotry: understandings of what is
reasonable change over time. While Phillips’s amici could confidently assert that
religious racists were “wicked” and could not rely on the Bible or on conscience
for their beliefs, my book shows the pervasiveness of the theology of segregation
during the 1950s and 1960s and how opponents and proponents of segregation
appealed to different parts of the same Bible verse. 27 To counter charges of
bigotry and prejudice, religious defenders of segregation appealed not only to
the Bible and to their conscience but also to science and reason.28
It is interesting to apply Corvino’s analysis of bigotry, with his emphasis on
bad epistemic hygiene, to a recent news story that seemed a throwback to a racist
past, when the theology of segregation was prevalent: an owner of a wedding
venue in Boonseville, Mississippi, informed a couple who had been coordinating
with the owner about hosting their wedding that she could not let them use her
hall.29 She had discovered that they were an interracial couple and explained,
“First of all, we don’t do gay weddings or mixed race [weddings] . . . because of
our Christian race, I mean, our Christian belief.”30 In a recording of a follow-up
encounter, when LaKambria Welch, the white bride-to-be, asked the woman,
“So what in the Bible tells you that[?]” the woman interrupted, saying, “Well, I
don’t want to argue my faith.”31 What happened next is particularly interesting:
the hall owner apologized but also explained that she had come to see that “the
reasoning” behind her turning away the couple was “incorrect.”32 As The
Washington Post reported, her apology included an attempt to explain how she
had only recently discovered that the Bible did not support her views on
interracial marriages:
She began by writing that “as a child growing up in Mississippi” it was an
unspoken understanding that people stayed “with your own race.” But then
on Saturday, when her husband asked her to point to relevant sections of
the Bible, she couldn’t. After spending hours scouring the text and sitting
down with her pastor, the owner wrote that she finally concluded that the
reasoning behind her decision to turn away [the couple] was incorrect.
“As my bible reads, there are 2 requirements for marriage and race has
nothing to do with either!” the Facebook post read. “All of my years I had
27

Id. (manuscript at ch. 4). The verse was Acts 17:26: “Of one blood has God made all
nations for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before
appointed, and the bounds of their habitation.” Id. (manuscript at 84) (quoting Acts 17:26
(King James)).
28
Id. (manuscript at 81-85).
29
Allyson Chiu, A Mississippi Wedding Venue Rejected an Interracial Couple, Citing
‘Christian Belief.’ Facing a Backlash, the Owner Apologized, WASH. POST: MORNING MIX
(Sept. 3, 2019, 7:04 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/09/03/mississippiwedding-venue-rejects-interracial-couple-christian-belief-apologized/.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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‘assumed’ in my mind that I was correct, but have never taken the
opportunity to research and find whether this was correct or incorrect until
now.”33
I offer three observations about this incident (although there are many more I
could offer, if space permitted). First, on Corvino’s analysis, because this owner
was willing to examine the basis for her beliefs and recognize that she was wrong
about what the Bible said and that her “reasoning” was incorrect, she did not
show the “stubbornness” characteristic of a bigot who systematically discounts
evidence that “would upset the bigot’s views.”34 While her underlying belief was
racist, she claimed to be able to recognize the wrongness of her belief and to
apologize. Second, by contrast to her inability to find Bible verses supporting
the childhood teaching to stay “with your own race,” ministers and politicians
several decades ago would have readily and confidently cited numerous biblical
verses to support their argument that God was the “greatest segregationist,” that
interracial marriage violated God’s plan, and that segregation was the
“Christian” way.35 Third, her appeal to her childhood training suggests the
disturbing persistence of “folkways” teaching, supporting, and practicing racial
separation, despite official repudiation (at the denominational level) of support
for segregation and repentance for that support (as I discuss with respect to the
Southern Baptist Convention).36
Notably, under Mississippi’s “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from
Government Discrimination Act,” this wedding venue owner could deny service
to a same-sex couple on the basis of her “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral
convictions” that marriage “is or should be recognized as the union of one man
and one woman.”37 The law does not, however, protect “sincerely held religious
beliefs or moral convictions”38 that people should stay “with your own race” and
not intermarry.39 Some commentators, nonetheless, have linked this conscience
protection law to objections like that of the owner, arguing that it “lays the
groundwork for people to assert that beliefs alone are enough to validate racial
discrimination.”40 Some of the contributors to this book symposium express
similar concerns that it is hard to cabin the scope of religious objections once
state laws allow them into the marketplace, as I now discuss.

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id.
Corvino, supra note 4, at 2591.
MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at chs. 4-5).
Id. (manuscript at 86-90, 101).
H.B. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016).
Id.
Chiu, supra note 29.
Id.
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MELISSA MURRAY

I agree with Murray’s insightful argument about the evolution over time in
the type of rhetoric used in objecting to opposing civil rights for LGBTQ people
as well as marriage equality.41 In Chapter Seven of Who’s the Bigot?,42 I attempt
to provide some sense of that evolution by tracing the trajectory from Bowers v.
Hardwick43 to Obergefell v. Hodges.44 The Court’s setting limits upon moral
disapproval as a justification for using both criminal (in Lawrence v. Texas)45
and civil (in Romer v. Evans)46 law to deny the liberty and equality of LGBTQ
persons contributed to that shift in argumentation. For example, arguments
shifted from appeals to collective moral judgments against “homosexuality” and
in favor of heterosexuality and “traditional marriage,” to appeals to definitional
arguments (that marriage has always and universally been the union of one man
and one woman), responsible procreation, gender complementarity, and the
unforeseen consequences of working a dramatic change to the definition of
marriage.47 Even as those arguments shifted, however, one constant was the
insistence that opposition to same-sex marriage or support for drawing
distinctions between heterosexual and gay citizens did not rest on bigotry or
animus but on some legitimate reason.48
I also agree with Murray that in the ongoing legal conflicts over state public
accommodations laws and access by same-sex couples to wedding goods and
services, a salient issue is “recasting the public sphere.”49 Murray evocatively
expresses this in terms of the “geography of bigotry.” 50 Murray compellingly
writes of how “the aggregative effect of religious accommodations is to shrink
the public sphere—and the domain of state-endorsed laws and norms—and
expand the private sphere and the authority of private actors who operate outside
of the State’s reach.”51 She urges caution over this simultaneous shrinking and
expanding and worries about the risk of instability of the public-private divide
and of reconfiguring the discursive language.52 She argues that “religious
accommodations recharacterize the challenged portions of the public sphere as
private space where dissenting views—and rank bigotry—may be safely
expressed.”53
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Murray, supra note 5, at 2617-22.
MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at ch. 7).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at ch. 7).
Id. (manuscript at 160-61, 164-69, 170-71).
Murray, supra note 5, at 2623-28.
Id. at 2629.
Id. at 2627.
Id. at 2627-28.
Id. at 2616.
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Murray persuasively argues that there are “high stakes involved in the current
debate over same-sex marriage and religious accommodations.”54 She cogently
advises that there are lessons to learn from efforts by white southerners to resist
mandated integration by “appealing to the private sphere,” both through
resorting to “restrictive covenants that prevented property from being sold to
racial minorities” and through the creation of private “‘segregation academies’
that provided a segregated alternative to integrated public schools.”55 I agree
with Murray that it is important to learn from the Civil Rights Movement and
the significance of the Supreme Court upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964
against a variety of constitutional challenges,56 as in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States57 and Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.58 As I discuss in
Chapters Five and Eight, those challenges effectively denied the legitimacy of
public accommodations laws and their reach, instead appealing to private
property, involuntary servitude, freedom of association, and freedom of religion
to justify continuing to segregate in spaces supposedly “open” to the public.59
The Court upheld the government’s compelling interest in ending discrimination
in such spaces.60 Notably, and encouragingly, the majority opinion in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission61 cited to
Piggie Park on the basic legitimacy of public accommodations laws and on the
general obligation to serve customers notwithstanding sincere philosophical or
religious objections, including to same-sex marriage.62
Perhaps the most frequently invoked image in arguments for a robust space
in the public sphere of the marketplace for religious dissenters is that conjured
by Justice Alito in his Obergefell dissent. There, Justice Alito warned that
dissenters from the new “orthodoxy” about marriage may still be able to whisper
their beliefs in their homes but that if they utter them in public, they will “risk
being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and
schools.”63
While Murray insists upon the importance of learning lessons about the
attempt to continue race discrimination in public by deeming spaces “private,”
Justice Alito argued that the majority’s analogies between race and sex
discrimination in marriage and the exclusion of same-sex couples will invite the
bigotry label. The recent Arizona Supreme Court opinion in Brush & Nib Studio,
54

Id. at 2631.
Id. at 2625.
56
Id. at 2630-31.
57
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
58
390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
59
MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at chs. 5, 8).
60
Id. (manuscript at 111, 125-27, 189, 203, 206-07).
61
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
62
Id. at 1727.
63
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642-43 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
55

2019]

RESPONSE TO COMMENTARIES

2721

LC v. City of Phoenix64 indicates the continuing power of Alito’s evocative
image.65 Arizona’s highest court upheld the free speech and free exercise of
religion claims (brought under Arizona’s Constitution) of the owners of a
stationery store against a new Phoenix antidiscrimination ordinance, in which
they asserted that they “hold traditional Christian beliefs about marriage,”
including that “‘God created two distinct genders in His image,’ and that only a
man and a woman can be joined in marriage.”66 Therefore, they filed an action
to enjoin the City of Phoenix from enforcing its antidiscrimination ordinance
against them and for declaratory relief.67 The court began its lengthy opinion
with this sentence: “The rights of free speech and free exercise, so precious to
this nation since its founding, are not limited to soft murmurings behind the
doors of a person’s home or church, or private conversations with like-minded
friends and family.”68 Instead, “[t]hese guarantees protect the right of every
American to express their beliefs in public,” including, in the stationery store’s
case, “the right to create and sell words, paintings . . . and art that express a
person’s sincere religious beliefs” and, more critically to the case, the right to
refuse to create when it is not consistent with those beliefs.69 In this forum, I will
not offer a full evaluation of the court’s opinion; my point is simply to show the
emphatic insistence by some that faith must not be relegated to the private
sphere—behind closed doors—but instead be exercised “in public,” including in
the market.
In Who’s the Bigot?, I argue for a framework inspired by Justice Bosson’s
concurring opinion in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock.70 I contend that such
a framework fits Justice Kennedy’s admonition in Masterpiece Cakeshop that
future disputes involving religious objections by merchants to complying with
public accommodations law “must be resolved with tolerance, without undue
disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to
indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.” 71 In Elane
Photography, Justice Bosson treated the sincere religious beliefs of the business
owners respectfully, while also explaining to them that the “price of citizenship”
in a pluralistic society requires that, while religious people may live out their
faith in many parts of their lives, once they enter the narrower sphere of the
marketplace and open their business to the public, they must practice civility and
tolerance and serve customers.72 Justice Bosson made this case by appealing to
64

448 P.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019).
Id. at 895 (echoing, without citing, Justice Alito’s dissent in Obergefell).
66
Id. at 898.
67
Id. at 899.
68
Id. at 895.
69
Id. (omission in original).
70
2013-NMSC-040, 309 P.3d 53.
71
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732
(2018).
72
Elane Photography, ¶ 92, 309 P.3d at 79-80.
65
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landmark civil rights cases to show the compelling governmental interests at
stake in antidiscrimination laws and by never labeling the plaintiffs, Elaine and
John Huguenin, bigots. Justice Bosson also powerfully explained how state
antidiscrimination laws that have expanded to prohibit discrimination based on
“sexual orientation” reflect a judgment that “to discriminate in business on the
basis of sexual orientation is just as intolerable as discrimination directed toward
race, color, national origin, or religion.”73
I continue to believe that Justice Bosson’s approach provides a useful way
forward, but I also know that conservative critics of Elane Photography who
argue for robust exemptions contend that the “price of citizenship” is too high.
To use Murray’s framework, those critics claim that the public marketplace must
have more space carved out for the exercise of religion, even when it has the
effect of excluding members of the public.
III. SONU BEDI
I appreciate Professor Sonu Bedi’s insightful reading of my book through the
lens of what it teaches about how moral disapproval of racial desegregation and
of homosexuality took the form of what he calls a “public and private
morality.”74 I am glad that Bedi finds my book’s use of the idea of a “lagging
indicator” useful for pointing out how “understanding the meaning of bigotry”
changes over time, which we can see in the “current moral debate about
homosexuality.”75 Bedi suggests that, in presenting to readers arguments made
against landmark civil rights legislation, my book manages to bring to the reader
arguments against civil rights laws that “now sound like voices from another
world” and also makes clear that the “debate over desegregation was also a
debate over the public and private sphere.”76
As with Professor Murray’s commentary, Bedi raises the question about “the
boundary of bigotry,” focusing on the ongoing issue of religious objections by
owners of businesses that are covered by state public accommodations laws.77
Supporters of merchants like Jack Phillips, who refused to bake a wedding cake
for a gay couple based on his religious beliefs about marriage, appeal to the right
to live out one’s faith in the marketplace. As Bedi recounts, I invoke Justice
Bosson’s concurring opinion in Elane Photography.78 As discussed above in my
response to Murray, Justice Bosson nowhere describes the Huguenins as
“bigots” and instead insists that their beliefs demand our respect; however, he
also appeals to the “price of citizenship” as requiring that they be willing to serve
customers once they enter the smaller, more focused world of “the marketplace
73

Id. ¶ 89, 309 P.3d at 79.
Bedi, supra note 5, at 2635.
75
Id. at 2640-41.
76
Id. at 2647 (quoting Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimmel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 493 (2000)).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 2644.
74
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of commerce.”79 Without using the rhetoric of bigotry, Bosson, as Bedi
observes, concludes that “moral disapproval of homosexuality” or, I would add,
refusing a customer service based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, has
“no place in the sphere of commerce and the marketplace.”80 Similarly, Bedi
argues that civil rights statutes, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Supreme
Court cases affirming such laws, like Piggie Park, “hold that racial bigotry has
no place in restaurants, movie theaters, businesses, and other such
nongovernmental spaces.”81 Once again, I would add “acting on racial bigotry
by denying customers service” to stress that civil rights law focuses on conduct,
not beliefs or attitudes, even as one effect of such laws may be to change “hearts
and minds.”82
I very much look forward to learning from Bedi’s new book, Private
Racism,83 which will undoubtedly help theorize and make progress on the
relationship between public and private racism and how conceptions of the
boundary between public and private may hinder steps to advance equality.
IV. DOUGLAS NEJAIME
Professor Douglas NeJaime persuasively argues that Professor Reva Siegel’s
“insight” about preservation-through-transformation “helps us to make sense of
the role of bigotry in contemporary struggles over LGBT equality.”84 Indeed, I
view my project in Who’s the Bigot? as compatible with Siegel’s assertion that
“[i]f we reconstruct the grounds on which our predecessors justified
subordinating practices of the past, we may be in a better position to evaluate
contested practices in the present.”85 I am gratified that NeJaime believes that I
have succeeded in undertaking that reconstruction and providing “a more cleareyed assessment of the role that bigotry plays in struggles over inequality.” 86
I appreciate that NeJaime notices the critical role of time in assessing bigotry
as well as in assessing what is “reasonable.” I largely agree with his analysis of
the arguments made in Masterpiece Cakeshop, and the Court’s decision
illustrates the dynamics of which NeJaime is acutely aware. As he points out,
“temporality is key to the Court’s reasoning”: because Phillips’s views “are still
considered reasonable and are widely held,” it “seems wrong to compare his
views” to religious justifications for slavery and racism, as those views “justified
79

See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
Bedi, supra note 5, at 2645.
81
Id.
82
Some of the supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressed that hope. See
MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 111-12).
83
See generally SONU BEDI, PRIVATE RACISM (2019).
84
NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2652.
85
Id. at 2653 (alteration in original) (quoting Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1111, 1113 (1997)).
86
Id.
80
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past practices that have been rightly and universally repudiated.”87 Justice
Kennedy insists that impartial civil rights commissioners must treat Phillips’s
views with respect.88 However, as NeJaime further observes, the Court does not
conclude that such treatment must “translate into a requirement of religious
exemptions.”89 As I similarly argue in Who’s the Bigot?, it is not necessary for
a neutral governmental decision-maker to conclude that Phillip is a bigot or that
his religious beliefs are bigoted to conclude that he is not entitled to an
exemption.90 The weighty governmental interests furthered by
antidiscrimination law may justify denying an exemption, and Justice
Kennedy’s opinion, as NeJaime observes, leaves that possibility open.91
Finally, I am very grateful to NeJaime for identifying a further puzzle about
bigotry: why people do not use the rhetoric of bigotry more often in discussing
“past practices of gender subordination.”92 Why do people not use the label
“bigotry” to address stereotypes about gender roles and about differences
between men and women?93 To illustrate the point, NeJaime highlights an
example in my book: the defense of Virginia’s law barring same-sex marriage
by claiming that centuries of gender-hierarchical marriage law rested on gender
complementarity and celebrating sex difference.94 NeJaime cogently argues that
because the Court and much law recognize “‘real differences’ between women
and men,” we are unlikely to dismiss “all views premised on sex-based
differences as bigoted” but instead to “leave space for some distinctions between
women and men.”95
I touch on this puzzle briefly in the concluding chapter of Who’s the Bigot?,
focusing particularly on transgender rights and how arguments like “biology, not
bigotry” feature in opposing more expansive definitions of “gender” for the
purposes of antidiscrimination law.96 In future work, I plan to do more on this
puzzle that NeJaime raises about gender and bigotry. For example, are the terms
“sexism” and “misogyny” sufficient to describe and condemn problems of
gender-based inequality? Does bigotry—often equated with hostility, contempt,
or hate—seem inapt to describe what social scientists call “benevolent” sexism,
defined as stereotypes rooted in paternalistic views about women rather than
hostility? 97 I plan, in future work, to attempt to retrieve the various contexts in
87
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Id. at 2669.
96
MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 221-29).
97
Id. (manuscript at 228) (detailing social science research on forms of sexism).
88

2019]

RESPONSE TO COMMENTARIES

2725

which the rhetoric of bigotry does appear in addressing problems of sex
inequality, including classic gender discrimination cases. Here I offer a preview
of such work.
On October 8, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in cases raising
the question of whether Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination
based on “sex” includes sexual orientation discrimination or gender identity
discrimination.98 It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court will resolve these
cases, but a quick glimpse at whether and how the parties and their amici enlist
the rhetoric of bigotry indicates some echoes of the patterns of arguments seen
in Masterpiece Cakeshop.
One similarity is to warn the Court against a ruling that would brand sincere
religious believers as bigots. For example, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc. v. EEOC99 concerns whether the Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that Title
VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on sex applied to a funeral home
owner, Thomas Rost, who fired a transgender female employee, Aimee
Stephens, because she wanted to “present” as a woman at work, including in her
work clothing.100 The Sixth Circuit concluded that Rost’s religious exercise was
not substantially burdened by applying Title VII to the funeral home. 101 As with
Jack Phillips, the funeral home and its amici appeal to the burden on their
“freedom of conscience” and “sincerely-held religious beliefs.” 102 For example,
“because Rost interprets the Bible as teaching that sex is immutable, he believed
that he ‘would be violating God’s commands’ if a male representative of Harris
Homes presented himself as a woman [by wearing a skirt-suit] while
representing the company.”103 Rost’s amici also warn the Court that unless they
reverse the Sixth Circuit, Justice Alito’s prediction in Obergefell about people
with traditional beliefs being “labeled as bigots and treated as such” would
“prove true here.”104 Citing Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Obergefell, the
National Association of Evangelicals argues that
placing sexual orientation and gender identity on the list of protected
classes, with no corresponding accommodation for religion, will in the
minds of millions elevate those classes to the same level of moral
98

Ariane de Vogue, Historic Supreme Court Arguments Tuesday in LGBTQ Workplace
Rights Dispute, CNN (Oct. 8, 2019, 7:23 PM) https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/08/politics
/supreme-court-lgbtq-arguments/index.html [https://perma.cc/G8FT-ND3W].
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884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (mem.).
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Id. at 567-69.
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, 14, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 139 S. Ct.
1599 (No. 18-107), 2018 WL 3572625, at *10, *14 (quoting EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris
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(citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642-43 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting)).

2726

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:2713

sensitivity as race—rendering those with traditional religious beliefs on
sexuality and gender morally suspect if not bigots.105
Another amicus argued that “biology is not bigotry” and that “this Court should
not conclude otherwise.”106
In response, Stephens and her amici made sparing use of the rhetoric of
bigotry. Instead, they argued about prejudice, drawing analogies to other nowprohibited forms of discrimination to emphasize the importance of learning from
history. For example, in their amicus brief, law professors William N. Eskridge
Jr. and Andrew M. Koppelman asserted, “The exclusion of a class of persons
from otherwise express protection on the basis of prejudice against them at the
time of enactment does not have an admirable history.” 107 Because Rost argued
that enforcing the dress code was necessary to avoid upsetting his grieving
customers, another amici countered that “discriminating to appease customer
prejudices” is a form of discrimination that “this Court has rejected for
decades.”108 Stephens similarly eschewed the language of bigotry, countering
Rost’s customer preference argument by enlisting prior Title VII sex
discrimination cases: “[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the
preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex
discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices
the [Civil Rights] Act was meant to overcome.”109 The few references to bigotry
in the amicus briefs filed on Stephens’s behalf referred to transgender employees
experiencing discriminatory treatment by coworkers, such as being “called
bigoted names and slurs.”110
This preliminary look at the rhetoric in some of the briefs indicates that
Professor NeJaime makes a sound suggestion in urging more engagement with
the puzzle of how bigotry features in controversies over sexism, gender
discrimination, and the future of civil rights law.
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Brief of National Ass’n of Evangelicals et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Employers
at 24, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (No. 18-107), 2019 WL 4075083,
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JAMES FLEMING

I owe Professor Jim Fleming enormous thanks for the many years of
constructive and generous engagement as I worked on this project. Beyond his
specific essay in this book, his contribution is much more extensive, including
numerous discussions, careful editing, and coauthored work that helped to shape
Who’s the Bigot?111 Confining myself only to his essay, however, I will simply
say that I agree with his analysis of how Justice Kennedy, the author of the
Court’s four “gay rights” opinions, shifted from a jurisprudence of animus, or a
focus on illicit emotions, to a focus on the social meaning of discriminatory
practices.112 Indeed, Fleming’s argument about this trajectory shaped my own
analysis.
I would point out, however, that the trajectory that Fleming tracks is more like
an oscillation between the two poles of Kennedy’s jurisprudential frameworks,
because United States v. Windsor113—which came after Lawrence and which
Fleming argues shows the shift away from animus—refers to Congress’s
purposes in enacting DOMA as seeking to disparage and injure. Justice Kennedy
quotes Romer’s language about “bare congressional desire to harm” in
explaining why DOMA violates the Constitution’s “guarantee of equality.” 114
Of course, other parts of Justice Kennedy’s opinion support Fleming’s
argument, because (as I observe in Chapter Seven of Who’s the Bigot?) Justice
Kennedy also “stresses DOMA’s harmful social meaning.”115 Justice Kennedy
writes about the stigma that DOMA imposes and the social meaning of the
federal government denying the very dignity that the State of New York sought
to confer in extending marriage to same-sex couples.116 His famous language
about the harm and humiliation suffered by same-sex couples’ children also
looks to the social meaning of discriminatory practices.117 But in any case,
Fleming and I both agree that Obergefell abandons any talk of animus or bad
motives, instead explaining the limits of using the law to put the state’s
“imprimatur” upon beliefs (however sincere) that deny other people liberty. 118
Finally, I agree with Fleming that the turn to the rhetoric of bigotry in the

111
See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING ET AL., GAY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2016); JAMES
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116
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disabilities.”).
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dissenting opinions stems more from the ongoing cultural war than from a
careful parsing of Justice Kennedy’s opinion.
VI. IMER FLORES
I appreciate Professor Imer Flores’s creative “law and literature” approach in
his response to my book manuscript. To counter my conclusion that, while the
rhetoric of bigotry carries risk, it is sometimes “necessary and appropriate,”
Flores enlists two novels by Harper Lee, the classic To Kill a Mockingbird119
and the controversial, posthumously published Go Set a Watchman,120 to argue
that that such rhetoric is neither necessary nor appropriate.121 Putting my book
into conversation with those two novels, Flores compares the rhetoric of bigotry
in these various texts to show how this rhetoric—both in fiction and in real life—
stops conversations, “backfires,” and “boomerangs,” rather than advancing
understanding or the goals of justice.122
One of the most intriguing features of Flores’s essay is his exposition of how
Lee’s characters, both in To Kill a Mockingbird and Go Set a Watchman, enlist
the rhetoric of bigotry and conscience and disagree over how to answer the
question “Who’s the bigot?” In Who’s the Bigot?, I argue that, in historical and
more recent political and legal controversies over marriage and civil rights,
people disagree over who is a bigot and why. They also flip the charges of
bigotry: as one example, while supporters of the landmark Civil Rights Act of
1964 called upon the nation’s conscience to enact legislation showing that “our
spirit is not narrow bigotry,” opponents of that legislation countered that those
who supported the law were the “real” bigots and, indeed, “anti-bigot bigots.” 123
Flores shows the same dynamic at work in Lee’s fiction, particularly in Go Set
a Watchman. Because of the iconic status both of To Kill a Mockingbird and of
country lawyer Atticus Finch as a paragon, many readers have found Go Set a
Watchman’s portrayal of Finch as a racist extremely disturbing.124 Certainly,
Finch’s daughter Jean Louise, in Go Set a Watchman, found his racial attitudes
and behavior deeply troubling. She finds it “disgusting” that he has joined a
citizens’ council in their home town of Maycomb, Alabama. 125
As Flores recounts, Jean Louise asks her uncle what has turned her father into
a “n––hater.”126 She resists her uncle’s attempts to explain her father’s behavior;
119
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later, her uncle turns to the rhetoric of bigotry but only to say that she is a bigot—
”not a big one, just an ordinary turnip-sized bigot”—while her father is not. 127
How is this possible? When Jean Louise looks up the dictionary definition, she
reads: “Bigot . . . . Noun. One obstinately or intolerably devoted to his own
church, party, belief, or opinion.”128 She then demands that her uncle explain
himself.129 He asserts that Jean Louise is a bigot because she was “rigid” and
would not “give” when her uncle challenged her opinions of her father, running
and lashing out rather than listening to his explanation of her father’s attitudes. 130
Flores contrasts the obstinacy that Jean Louise’s uncle attributes to her with
the advice her father gave her in To Kill a Mockingbird—in effect, about being
willing to try to understand another person’s perspective. However, instead of
the usual adage of walking a mile in another’s shoes,131 Atticus uses a more
provocative image given the time and setting of the book:
“First of all, . . . if you can learn a simple trick, Scout, you’ll get along a lot
better with all kind of folks. You never really understand a person until you
consider things from his point of view . . . until you climb into his skin and
walk around in it.”132
In effect, Dr. Finch (Uncle Jack) charges Jean Louise with being an “ordinary
turnip-sized bigot” for failing to heed this advice in judging her own father’s
transformation into an outright racist.133
But what would Jean Louise learn if she had taken that perspective? In the
scene in which her uncle tries to explain her father’s conduct—”Baby . . . all
over the South your father and men like your father are fighting a sort of
rearguard, delaying action to preserve a certain kind of philosophy that’s almost
gone down the drain”—she retorts, “If it’s what I heard yesterday I say good
riddance.”134 In other words, that “philosophy” should properly be condemned
and left behind. To call this philosophy bigoted would signal such
condemnation. And yet her uncle instead uses the label on Jean Louise because
she takes this “rigid” view of her father’s “philosophy,” unwilling to understand.
In a later scene, Atticus attempts to explain himself to Jean Louise,
acknowledging she is “upset by having seen me doing something you think is
wrong” but stating that he is trying to “make you understand my position.” 135
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Atticus’s “position” seems to be one of racial difference and separation.
Flores does not view Go Set a Watchman as a proper follow-up to To Kill a
Mockingbird, but he nonetheless offers an intriguing attempt to read it as a
chronological, even if improper, sequel by considering the different historical
settings of the books, from the 1930s to the 1950s. Flores suggests that the twin
developments of World War II and Brown v. Board of Education136 might
explain how Atticus, a seemingly “progressive character,” could become less so
over time.137 Atticus’s sentiments against racial integration resemble white
opposition, detailed in Who’s the Bigot?, to Brown and, later, to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 because of forced racial “inter-mingling” in schools, churches, and
other spaces of everyday life, as well as the supposed inevitability of interracial
marriage.138 Thus, Atticus questions Louise: “Do you want Negroes by the
carload in our schools and churches and theaters? Do you want them in our
world?”139 And: “Do you want your children going to a school that’s been
dragged down to accommodate Negro children?”140
As Atticus sums up his philosophy, “[S]o far in my experience, white is white
and black’s black. So far, I’ve not yet heard an argument that has convinced me
otherwise.”141 By tacking on that, although he is seventy-two, “I’m still open to
suggestion,”142 is Atticus saved from bigotry because he is not holding his view
“obstinately” and “rigidly” and would revise his views in light of new evidence?
Dr. Finch’s application of the rhetoric of bigotry, Flores’s example suggests,
shows some of the ways that the term is vulnerable to manipulation, so that the
anti-racist, not the racist, is the real bigot.
Notably, in Go Set a Watchman, Lee puts criticism of Brown in Jean Louise’s
mouth, too. Atticus begins by giving his reasons for joining the citizens’ council,
pointing to “[t]he Federal Government and the NAACP.”143 He then asks her
about her first reaction to the Brown decision; as Flores quotes, she answers “I
was furious” because “there they were, tellin’ us what to do again,” “rub[bing]
out” the Tenth Amendment to “satisfy” another amendment. 144 Jean Louise
makes a speech against judicial interference and the Court “breezily” canceling
the Tenth Amendment to “meet the real needs of a small portion of the
population,” rather than bringing about change through “Congress and state
legislatures like we should.”145 And yet, when Atticus concludes that they are in
agreement, because they both believe the “very same things,” including that the
136
137
138
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Constitution is “higher” than the Court, she and Atticus are again at odds because
she endorses the Court’s ruling, even though disapproving of the way it did it. 146
She reasons, “It was put under their noses and they had to do it,” and insists:
“Atticus, the time has come when we’ve got to do right” and “give ‘em [African
Americans] a chance.”147 He counters her appeal to giving African Americans
“the same opportunities anyone else has” by stating that they are free to go
elsewhere in the country to find what they want. 148
Their disagreement sharpens when Atticus blames the NAACP for stirring up
trouble and Jean Louise defends it, arguing that the NAACP came into the state
because of white failures to help blacks and noting that in response to Brown,
“we didn’t give an inch” or try to help people “live with the decision”: “I think
we deserve everything we’ve gotten from the NAACP and more.”149
The conversation degenerates as Jean Louise recounts how, growing up, she
looked up to Atticus and believed in him and what he taught her about justice
and right, which did not prepare her for his present beliefs and deeds.150 Arguing
that he views blacks as “subhuman” and denies them any hope, she compares
his views to that of Hitler and the “crowd” in Russia.151 After calling him a “nice,
sweet, old gentleman,” she concludes “I despise you and everything you stand
for” and states, when he responds that he loves her, “I’m getting out of this place
fast.”152 She is, in effect, unable to hate the sin, not the sinner, or to separate
bigoted beliefs and actions from the bigot. Instead, she is “sick of” his “moral
double-dealing” and vows that she will “never believe a word [he] say[s] to [her]
again.”153
Is Lee trying to convey how an educated white man in the Deep South could
support Massive Resistance? Is Atticus representative of the white “moderate,”
who perceived himself as caught between the two “extremes” of the Klan and
the NAACP?154 Notably, Jean Louise resists Atticus’s attack on the NAACP.
Flores argues that while, in To Kill a Mockingbird, Atticus realizes that
“folkways” may be harder to change than “stateways,” in Go Set A Watchman,
he exemplifies the recalcitrance of “folkways” resisting efforts to establish new
“stateways.”155 This recalcitrance spurs Jean Louise to vote with her feet and
vow to break both her family relationship with Atticus and her relationship to
the South, and to go to a place so she will never “see” or “hear” of “another
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Finch . . . as long as I live.”156 In effect, Jean Louise views her father and people
with his racial views as irredeemable, or at least she does not view it as her task
to stay around and work toward that redemption. In a passage of the book not
quoted by Flores, Atticus elaborates on the basis for his “position” that “white
is white and black’s black.”157 When Jean Louise invokes principles like “equal
rights for all; special privileges for none,” he counters by asking if she has ever
considered that “you can’t have a set of backward people [‘our Negro
population’] living among people advanced in one kind of civilization and have
a social Arcadia.”158 These are part of Atticus’s evident “plain truths”159 about
how things “are”—i.e., “folkways,” “white ways.” He tells Jean Louise that the
black people “down here” are “still in their childhood as a people,” although
they have made “terrific progress in adapting themselves to white ways.” 160
Evidently, the two different portrayals of Atticus in To Kill a Mockingbird
and Go Set a Watchman reflect Harper Lee’s complex and ambivalent
relationship with her own father—lawyer and newspaperman A.C. Lee. 161 That
may account for the vehemence and passion with which Jean Louise denounces
her father in Go Set a Watchman, dramatically charging him with “killing her”
because of the contrast between her upbringing and his current behavior.162 As
biographer Joseph Crespino puts it, “A.C. Lee would be an inspiration for his
daughter’s fiction not because he was ahead of his time . . . but rather because
he was of his time . . . and of his place, and yet still aspired to worthy ideals and
noble virtues.”163 A.C. Lee was both a “principled opponent of mob rule” and a
“racial paternalist” who was strongly critical of any attempt by “outside groups
or bureaucracies” to judge the South’s morality or mitigate racial bias in
Alabama.164 In his numerous editorials for the paper he owned and edited, the
Monroe Journal, he “praised law-enforcement officers who protected black
prisoners from lynchings” but “opposed a federal anti-lynching law,” because
(in his words) it “violates the fundamental idea of states rights and is aimed as a
form of punishment upon the southern people.”165
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A.C. Lee and Harper Lee shared a desire that the world have a “better opinion
of upper-class Southern WASPs than they deserve,” a group described by
Howell Raines, in a review of Crespino’s book, as “genteel white supremacists”:
“educated, well-read, well-traveled Alabamans who would never invite George
Wallace into their homes, but nonetheless watched in silence as he humiliated
poor Alabama in the eyes of the world.”166 To Kill a Mockingbird would seem
to serve that goal: while it shows “class bigotry” toward its lower-class white
villains, Atticus gave Alabama a “civic mythology it could live with.”167 The
Pulitzer Prize-winning novel and the Oscar-winning film adaptation gave
Alabama “an internationally accepted statement that we are better than the rest
of America . . . has been willing to admit.”168 By comparison, Go Set a
Watchman told a different story about the South that publishers “didn’t want to
tell”: Atticus Finch is “overtly racist,” “benighted,” and “a gentleman bigot”
engaged in “stilted exchanges” with his “more enlightened daughter.”169
Flores also uses Lee’s two novels to examine the challenges in eradicating
prejudice (including implicit biases—or the bigot in our brains—as well as overt
or blatant prejudice—or bigotry). He is skeptical that “conscience” alone can do
the work, even when law embraces “conscience” through antidiscrimination
laws (“legislating morality,” as I discuss in Chapter Five of Who’s the Bigot?).170
Countering the premise or faith that “conscience” can indict and eliminate
“bigotry” and that “stateways can change folkways,” as social scientists and civil
rights movement activists argued, is the problem that people also appeal to
“conscience” to defend their prejudices and oppose civil rights laws, as Who’s
the Bigot? and Go Set a Watchman both show.171
Lee’s two novels show conscience in both these guises. In To Kill a
Mockingbird, when Scout (Jean Louise) seems to enlist majority rule as a guide
to what is right, she tells Atticus that “most folks seem to think they’re right and
you’re wrong,” to which he responds by appealing to his conscience as beyond
the reach of majority rule.172 He explains that, while others are “certainly entitled
to think that [he’s wrong], and they’re entitled to full respect for their
opinions, . . . before I can live with other folks I’ve got to live with myself. The
one thing that doesn’t abide by majority rule is a person’s conscience.”173 By
comparison, “conscience” is more problematic in Go Set a Watchman because
it seems to be invoked to justify Atticus’s shocking (to Jean Louise) racial views.
Indeed, Flores quotes Jean Louise’s uncle, Dr. Finch, telling her: “Every man’s
166
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island, Jean Louise, every man’s watchman, is his conscience. There is no such
thing as a collective conscious.”174 As Flores points out, conscience appears not
just as a bulwark against “the majority” but also, as it is individual, leads to
pitting one conscience against another.175 The context in which Dr. Finch says
this to Jean Louise warrants mentioning: he suggests that, until her
disillusionment with her father, her own conscience had been too bound up with
her father’s (like a “barnacle”), and she idealized him, confusing him “with God”
and not seeing his “failings.”176 He asserts that both he and her father realized
this and wondered what would cause “[her] conscience and his” to part
company; he tells her that the spur proved to be seeing Atticus “doing something
that seemed to you to be the very antithesis of his conscience—your
conscience.”177 Her uncle claims that Atticus permitted her to attack him without
defending himself because she had to “break” her “icons” and “reduce him to
the status of a human being.”178 It is during this conversation that Dr. Finch
charges Jean Louise with being “an ordinary turnip-sized bigot” for running
from Atticus and the “pretty offensive talk” instead of her (bigoted) “tendency
not to give anybody elbow room in [her] mind for their ideas, no matter how
silly” she thinks they are. He urges her to “take time” for such people,179 and the
book’s ending suggests that she might be willing to stay.
Flores argues that the best ways to combat prejudice are education and social
interaction (or what I discuss in Who’s the Bigot? as social contact on terms of
equality, or intergroup contact). To Kill a Mockingbird offers some positive
examples, as when Atticus instructs Scout and Jem not to use the “n—word,”
even though that’s how “everybody at school” speaks.180 Further, Atticus, in this
more benevolent incarnation, is a moral tutor, explaining to Scout that she must
“hold her head high” at school and not speak the way others do, and stating that
the term “n—lover”—a term applied to Atticus for his legal defense of Tom
Robinson—is a “common, ugly term to label somebody,” a term used by
“ignorant, trashy people . . . when they think somebody’s favoring Negroes over
and above themselves.”181 Further, as Flores recounts, elsewhere in the novel
Atticus embraces the charge of “n—lover,” turning it into a positive trait: “I
certainly am. I do my best to love everybody.”182
In Go Set a Watchman, Jean Louise is jarred by the contrast between Atticus’s
current positions on race and the “color blind” and virtuous way in which she
was “raised, by a black woman [Calpurnia, the family maid] and a white man
174
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[Atticus]” never to “take advantage of anybody” less fortunate than she was “in
brains, wealth, or social position.”183 Flores relates this child-rearing philosophy
to the role of social interaction in combating prejudice: encountering others with
an attitude (invoking Dworkin) of “equal concern and respect.”184 As Flores
points out, the prescription for fighting implicit bias offered by present-day
social scientists goes further, urging that people change their lives to encounter
members of minority groups on a regular basis so they are not “betrayed” by
“hesitation and discomfort.”185 This affirmative prescription goes further than
the guidance of not taking advantage. By contrast, in Go Set a Watchman,
Atticus favors racial separation, invoking images of “busloads” of black people
descending upon schools, churches, and public spaces. Later in the novel, Dr.
Finch seems to criticize Jean Louise for being “color blind,” seeing only
individual differences, and for being unable to “think racially,” even as “race is
the burning issue of the day.”186 But Dr. Finch seems to have some
consciousness of how racial prejudice distorts this “issue.” When Jean Louise
counters that that does not mean that she wants to “run out and marry a Negro
or something,” her uncle seems to recognize that the issue of interracial marriage
is “one of the tom-toms the white supremacists beat”; attending racially
integrated schools does not lead inevitably to intermarriage, but white
supremacists “wrap” the issue up in “a miasma of sex,” because they know it
will “strike terror in Southern mothers.”187 Dr. Finch does not approve of these
tactics, observing, “[T]he white supremacists fear reason, because they know
cold reason beats them.”188 This is the context in which Dr. Finch makes the
statement about prejudice quoted by Flores: “Prejudice, a dirty word, and faith,
a clean one, have something in common: they both begin where reason ends.”189
Flores concludes his provocative commentary on Lee’s two novels by
returning to Atticus’s advice to have empathy through perspective-taking
(“climb into [the other person’s] skin and walk around in it”). 190 Flores urges
that we keep the conversation open and attempt to hear “both sides of the story,”
even when we dislike the other point of view.191 In this vein, the “radical
empathy” Atticus teaches Scout and Jem is part of his legacy: “[M]illions of
Americans credit Harper Lee with teaching them how to understand difference”
by heeding Atticus’s advice.192 On the other hand, that radical empathy is a
source of one criticism of To Kill A Mockingbird’s Atticus Finch; he insisted on
183
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“the human decency of even overt bigots.”193 Tellingly, a new stage production
turns that empathy and his belief in the “goodness in everyone, even homicidal
white supremacists,” into “his fundamental flaw.”194
In the scenes Flores describes from Go Set a Watchman, Jean Louise does not
show such empathy toward Atticus, ultimately choosing to separate from him
and from the South. However, by the end of the novel, Jean Louise seems to
have had a change of heart and to be more willing to keep the conversation
going. Her uncle asks her if she would be willing to “come[] home” because
“there’s room for you down here,” and the town needs her.195 When she says
that she would not “fit in” and cannot fight everybody, her uncle observes that
“[y]ou’d be amazed if you knew how many people are on your side,” but “we
need some more of you.”196 He argues that “the time your friends need you is
when they’re wrong” and opines that “it takes a certain kind of maturity to live
in the South these days,” suggesting that Jean Louise might be able to achieve it
if she remains.197
In the final chapter, Atticus tells her he is proud of her for holding her ground
“for what she thinks is right,” including standing up to him. 198 After she tells
him that she thinks that she loves him “very much,” she sees “her old enemy’s
shoulders relax” and gets into the car with him, “welcom[ing] him silently to the
human race.” Yet a “stab of discovery” makes her “tremble a little.”199 What is
that discovery? She seems to have shifted from wanting to “crush” him,
“stamp[ing] out all the people like him” to “preserve” her world, to viewing
things more as a matter of balancing—balancing between the “thrust” and
“drag” of an airplane.200 The reader is left to wonder whether Jean Louise will
be willing and able to play a transformative role in the life of her father and in
the town that “needs her.”
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